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Privatization in India is mostly limited to the diﬀuse sale of minor-
ity stakes in ﬁrms. Since control rights have not been transferred to
private owners it is widely contended that the process has had little
impact on ﬁrm behavior. We ﬁnd however that even the sale of minor-
ity stakes has a positive impact on ﬁrm performance and productivity.
As the government remains the controlling owner in these ﬁrms, we
infer that the improvement is attributable to the role of the stock mar-
ket in monitoring managerial performance rather than to a change in
owners’ objectives. Consistent with this interpretation, we ﬁnd that
improvements in earnings are due to an increase in the productivity
o fl a b o rr a t h e rt h a nl a y o ﬀs. Partial privatization continues to aﬀect
the sales and operating eﬃciency of ﬁrms when we control for compet-
itive conditions, and the evidence also suggests that privatization and
competition have a complementary impact on ﬁrm performance.
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11 Introduction
The economic transition of socialist economies and the trend towards pri-
vatization within both developing and developed market economies have
generated a large empirical literature on the eﬀect of ownership on ﬁrm per-
formance. Most of these studies ﬁnd that privatization has a positive impact
on the proﬁtability and eﬃciency of ﬁrms (see Megginson and Netter, 2001,
for a recent survey). The ﬁrms in these studies have had a majority of
their assets privatized and control rights have been transferred from the
government to private owners. Surprisingly little is known about the ef-
fect of partial privatization in which control rights are not transferred, even
though most privatization transactions of signiﬁcant size are partial sales of
equity often through the stock market. This paper uses information on the
fraction of equity sold through partial privatizations in India to investigate
whether the performance of government-owned ﬁr m si sa ﬀected by the sale
of minority stakes.
In a sample of 630 privatization oﬀers from 59 countries, Jones, Meggin-
son, Nash, and Netter, (1999) ﬁnd that an average of 36.8% of capital is sold
in these oﬀers, with less than 8% of the ﬁrms selling a 100% of their capital.
India’s privatization program too has proceeded slowly with an average of
16 percent of equity in 44 of 258 centrally-owned ﬁrms sold in the ten years
following the adoption of the privatization policy in 1991.1 Through 1999
the government had raised only about $4 billion according to the Depart-
ment of Disinvestment (2001),2 and South Asia’s share of total privatization
revenues raised by developing countries was just 4 percent in 1999, while
L a t i nA m e r i c aa n dt h eC a r i b b e a na c c o u n t e df o r54 per cent (World Bank,
2001). The pace has picked up slightly in recent years with three ﬁrms being
sold to strategic partners in 2000,3 but sale of non-controlling shares remains
the primary method of privatization.
The theoretical literature on privatization considers two types of prob-
lems associated with government ownership: the political problem that po-
litical interference distorts the objectives and constraints faced by managers
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1994) and the managerial problem that poor monitor-
ing leads to low-powered incentives among managers (Vickers and Yarrow,
1The total number of ﬁr m si n c l u d e sb o t hﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms.
2The World Bank reports $8.83 billion in privatization revenues between 1991 and 1999
(World Bank, 2001).
3These are Modern Foods (74% of which was sold in 2000), Lagan Jute Machinery
(sold in 2000), and Bharat Aluminium Company (sold in 2001). Sale negotiations have
been completed in an additional 5 ﬁrms in the last quarter of 2001.
21989).4 In ﬁrms that have been fully privatized it is diﬃcult to identify
whether the observed improvements in ﬁrm performance occur because the
new owners pursue proﬁt maximization rather than other objectives, or be-
cause the new owners are better able to monitor managers. Partial priva-
tization without transfer of control allows us to concentrate on the second
possibility. The ﬁrm remains under government control and subject to polit-
ical interference, but the trading of shares on public stock markets provides
current information on the ﬁrm’s performance as judged by market partic-
ipants. This information can be used by the state to better monitor the
managers, and can also be used by managers in the executive job market as
a public signal of their performance.
India’s adoption of the disinvestment policy was accompanied by two
other policies that allow us to investigate the relative eﬀects of privatization
and competition. “Dereservation” eliminated restrictions on private entry
into all but 4 out of 17 sectors that used to be reserved for the public sector.
At the same time, restrictions on foreign equity investments were liberalized
in all but a few sectors of the economy. While some have argued that man-
ager incentives can be shaped better by competition (Vickers and Yarrow,
1989), others argue that so long as public sector ﬁrms are characterized by
political interference and poor governance, ineﬃciencies cannot be fully ad-
dressed by increased competition (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). By controlling
for changes in competitive conditions we are also able to ensure that changes
in ﬁrm behavior are not incorrectly attributed to privatization.
We observe ﬁrm level panel data on the population of non-ﬁnancial pub-
lic sector ﬁrms owned by the central (federal) government of India, account-
ing for approximately 85 percent of the overall assets of non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms
owned by the state and central governments. We observe the pre and post-
privatization performance of all 36 ﬁrms privatized by the central govern-
ment upto 1998.5 The data extends for nine years starting from 1990, the
year prior to the economic reforms undertaken in 1991. We also include
about 44 manufacturing and non-ﬁnancial service sector ﬁrms owned by
regional governments. The accounting information was compiled from an-
nual income statements and has been used recently by Bertrand, Mehta, and
Mullainathan (2001), among others. We supplement this data with informa-
tion on employment from annual surveys of public enterprises published by
the government, and with information on privatization transactions for each
ﬁrm obtained from newspaper reports, government sources, and the World
4LaPorta and Lopez-di-Silanes (1999) also use this categorization.
5We also observe the pre-privatization performance of the 8 ﬁrms sold since 1998.
3Bank. We have information on the fraction of equity sold in each ﬁrm in a
given year. The eﬀe c to fm a r k e tr e f o r m so nﬁrm performance is captured by
the two policy measures described earlier: dereservation, where after nearly
forty years of protection, 13 out of 17 protected sectors were opened to do-
mestic and foreign private participation; and liberalization, which allowed
for automatic approval of foreign participation in certain sectors.
Comparing the mean performance of ﬁrms in the years prior to the ﬁrst
tranche of partial privatization to average performance in the years following
the ﬁrst tranche, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerences in revenues, labor produc-
tivity, and the share of government loans in the total borrowings of ﬁrms.
Compared to average performance in the prior years, sales and proﬁts in-
crease by 59 percentage points and 22.6 percentage points respectively, and
the fraction of loans ﬁnanced by the government declines by 5.8 percentage
points. On the other hand employment does not appear to change signiﬁ-
cantly after partial privatization. To control for ﬁrm-speciﬁc and macroeco-
nomic factors that could account for performance change, we also estimate
ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcations to investigate the average impact of partial
privatization on ﬁrm performance, using ﬁrms that remain wholly owned by
the government as the control group. We ﬁnd that a 10 percentage point
decrease in the share of government equity would increase sales by 27 per-
centage points, proﬁts by 15 percentage points, average product of labor
(sales over labor) by 6 percentage points, and returns to labor (operating
income over employment) by 8 percentage points. However, there is no
accompanying decline in employment.
The results also indicate that partial privatization continues to have a
signiﬁcant impact on ﬁrm performance when we control for competitive con-
ditions. Firms in sectors that were previously reserved for the government
are found to react favorably to dereservation as seen by signiﬁcantly higher
sales revenues and proﬁt s . O nt h eo t h e rh a n dw eﬁnd that liberalizing re-
strictions on foreign participation has an adverse impact on sales. Unlike
privatization, changes in competitive conditions do not appear to aﬀect pro-
ductive eﬃciency as measured by the average product of labor and returns
to labor. However competitive pressures do have an impact on allocative
eﬃciency since they appear to reduce employment. These results suggest
that improvements in ﬁrm performance can be brought about through a
combination of privatization and competition enhancing policies.
We also ﬁnd evidence that the share of government loans in total bor-
rowing has a statistically signiﬁcant and negative impact on both sales and
proﬁts which is consistent with the view that the government may use loans
to pursue objectives other than proﬁt maximization. However, it does not
4appear that soft budget constraints aﬀect the level of employment in these
ﬁrms.6
The ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcation takes into account selection bias arising
out of time invariant unobservable factors that aﬀect performance, such as
w o u l do c c u ri fm o r ep r o ﬁtable or larger ﬁrms are selected for privatization.
In the estimations we also include ﬁrm speciﬁc controls and year dummies
to control for contemporaneous macroeconomic shocks. To the extent that
selection may be dynamic, as when ﬁrms are being sold because they have
better management or they are able to adjust better to market reforms, and
these characteristics are unobservable (to the researcher) and shifting over
time, ﬁxed eﬀects estimates would be inconsistent. It is diﬃcult to identify
and correct for all such eﬀects, however we use a number of approaches that
potentially address this issue. First, we investigate the impact of the fraction
of equity sold on the performance of privatized ﬁrms in a given year where
the control group consists of ﬁrms that have been selected for privatization
in later years. Frydman et al. (1999) argue that the control group of ﬁrms
would share similar unobservable characteristics that materialize over time
hence this method would potentially address dynamic selection. We ﬁnd that
the results reported earlier do not change. Second, like Bartel and Harrison
(2001) we compare the pre-privatization performance of ﬁrms to ﬁrms that
are not privatized to check whether there is selection based on unusually
good or bad performance just prior to privatization which could lead to
under or overestimation of the eﬀect of privatization (Ashenfelter, 1978), and
again do not ﬁnd evidence of selection. Third, we estimate all speciﬁcations
excluding the oil and gas companies which are arguably the most proﬁtable
and have the greatest potential in terms of future proﬁtability among the
state-owned ﬁrms, and ﬁnd that the results remain similar.
In the next section we describe the main characteristics of India’s eco-
nomic reforms and its public sector. Following this we brieﬂyd i s c u s st h e
theory on ownership and empirical implications for the data. Sections 4
and 5 describe the data, results, and potential problems with the estimation
strategy that we address. We conclude and discuss extensions in Section 6.
2 Background of the Indian privatization program
In response to a foreign exchange crisis in 1991, India undertook sweeping
economic reforms which included deregulation and privatization. Since the
6However soft budget constraints do have a signiﬁcant negative impact on employment
as we shall see in Section 5.3 below, when we consider a smaller sample of ﬁrms.
5Industrial Policy Resolution of 1991 which outlined the economic reforms,
the privatization goal declared in every government’s annual budget is to
reduce government ownership to 26 per cent of equity in all non-strategic
ﬁrms.7 Euphemistically referred to as “disinvestment”, privatization has
proven to be the most diﬃcult to implement of all the reforms. To date
the disinvestment process in ﬁrms owned by the federal government has
consisted of the sale of an average of 16 per cent of equity in 44 ﬁrms
out of 258 ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms, including the strategic sale of
three ﬁrms between 1999 and 2001 and the approval of another ﬁve ﬁrms in
late 2001.8 There were 14 rounds of disinvestment between 1991 and 2000
through which the government raised about $4 billion in revenues (Depart-
ment of Public Enterprises, 2001 and Department of Disinvestment, 2001).
In the ﬁrst round in 1991 and 1992 the government raised $638 million in
revenues through the sale of between 5 and 20 per cent of equity in 31 ﬁrms.9
Bundles of shares in these ﬁrms were sold mainly to domestic ﬁnancial in-
stitutions. In response to allegations that shares had been sold at too low
ap r i c ei nt h eﬁrst round, bundling of shares was abandoned and shares of
each company were sold by auction between 1992 and 1993. In 1994 the
g o v e r n m e n tp e r m i t t e dt h ep a r t i c i p a t i o no ff o r e i g n e r s ,a n di nt h ed i s i n v e s t -
ments of 1996-1999, ﬁrms in the telecommunications, oil, and construction
sectors were sold via global depository receipts in international markets in
addition to sales in domestic capital markets. A controversial event of the
disinvestment process was the purchase of equity in state-owned companies
by other state-owned companies in 1999. Our data includes privatization
transactions between 1991 and 1998, hence we do not consider ﬁrms that
sold equity to other state-owned ﬁrms nor do we observe the full privati-
zation of three companies between 1999 and 2001. We have also checked
stock-market participation among the partially privatized ﬁrms in our sam-
ple and ﬁnd that with the exception of 2 ﬁrms, all the other privatized ﬁrms
in our sample are listed with their shares being traded on the stock market
since they were privatized, and not prior to that. The remaining 2 ﬁrms are
owned by state governments and are not publicly traded.
Large-scale government ownership of ﬁrms in India was originally justi-
ﬁed by concerns that the private sector would not undertake projects requir-
ing large investments with long gestation periods. Starting in the late 1960s
7Strategic ﬁrms are those in the defense, atomic energy, and railway sectors. 26% is
the minimum amount of equity necessary for some certain voting powers.
8Our data ends in 1998 and we observe all 36 ﬁrms sold by the central government
upto that year.
9Rs 30.38 billion converted at Rs 47 = $1 into current dollars.
6there was a period of rapid nationalization of ﬁrms in all sectors, so that
by the mid-seventies the public sector accounted for one-ﬁf t ho fG D Pa n d
two-thirds of the total ﬁxed capital invested in the economy (Goyal, 1999).
The Indian public sector consists of departmental enterprises that are run
directly by government ministries, such as the railways, the postal service,
telecommunications, irrigation, and power, and enterprises that have sepa-
rate boards of directors. At the end of 1992 there were 1180 ﬁrms in which
the government was the majority owner, 941 of which were owned by state
governments. However, ﬁrms owned by the central government account for
nearly 85 per cent of the overall assets of state-owned companies. Over 42
per cent of the ﬁrms owned by the central government are in manufacturing,
28.62 per cent in mining, and nearly 20 per cent are utilities, while a third
of state government ﬁrms are in manufacturing, with the remaining ﬁrms
primarily concentrated in agriculture and ﬁnance (Goyal, 1999). Public sec-
tor ﬁrms are large employers, with 2 million workers employed in central
government ﬁrms in the nineties, accounting for 10 per cent of the total
workforce in the organized sector.10
The disinvestment program has not moved as fast as planned. So far
control has been transferred in just three ﬁrms to private owners. Further,
in every year except 1991 and 1998, disinvestment revenues have fallen short
of the targets set by the government in its annual budget (in 1999 the gov-
ernment achieved just 18 per cent of its revenue target). Finally, the public
sector remains unproﬁtable, with an average ratio of after-tax proﬁts to net
sales of −4.38% in public sector manufacturing enterprises between 1991
and 1997 compared to 6.65% for private sector manufacturing ﬁrms (De-
partment of Disinvestment, 2001). Nearly half the public sector enterprises
owned by the federal government are loss-making. In the government’s own
words, privatization would help in: “releasing huge amounts of scarce pub-
lic resources locked up in non-strategic PSEs (public sector enterprises) for
deployment in areas such as public health, education, etc.; stemming the
further outﬂow of scarce public resources for sustaining the unviable en-
terprises; reducing public debt; transferring the commercial risk, to which
tax-payers’ money is exposed, to the private sector; releasing other tangi-
ble and intangible resources, such as, large manpower currently locked up
in managing PSEs, for redeployment in areas that are much higher on the
social priority” (Department of Disinvestment, 2001).
10The total workforce in the organized sector (registered companies) was estimated
at 27 million in 1997, with 20 million employed in central and state governments, and
government enterprises (Department of Disinvestment, 2001).
7Prior to 1991 India had an elaborate regulatory framework which in-
volved restrictions on who could invest, how much, in what, and where.
Despite the licensing requirements,11 the foreign ownership restrictions, and
the restrictions on monopolistic business practices, not a single violation of
any of these regulations was prosecuted in four decades. Instead, rampant
rent-seeking led to an ineﬃcient use of resources to circumvent the numer-
ous regulations. While deregulation started in the mid-seventies, it was not
until 1991 that most of the restrictions on business practices were removed.
T h em a i nd e r e g u l a t o r ym e a s u r e su n d e r t a k e ni n1 9 9 1t h a ta ﬀected the public
sector were those allowing private sector participation in sectors previously
reserved for the government and dispensing with ceilings on foreign equity.
Dereservation reduced the number of sectors reserved for the public sector
from seventeen to four. Only arms and ammunition, atomic energy produc-
tion, mining of minerals related to atomic energy, and railway transportation
remain closed to the private sector.12 Since 1991 there have been a num-
ber of joint ventures between public sector companies in dereserved sectors
and domestic and foreign companies, including the ventures between Indian
Oil Company and Mobil; IBP (retailer for gas) and Caltex Petroleum; and
Balmer & Lawrie Freight Containers and Tectrans of Germany.
Another deregulatory measure, which we refer to as liberalization, was
the automatic approval of foreign equity up to 74 per cent in certain sec-
tors.13 Investors still have to obtain government approval in the following
industries: coal and lignite; petroleum; alcohol; sugar; tobacco products;
defense and aerospace equipment; hazardous chemicals; and drugs and phar-
maceutical products.
Following these changes in entry restrictions there have been a number of
domestic and foreign entrants in the energy and telecommunications sectors.
11The “license raj” referred to the process by which ﬁrms had to apply for licenses, or
government approval, for a wide range of activities.
12The sectors reserved for the public sector which were opened to private participation
are Iron and Steel; Heavy Castings and Forgings of Iron and Steel; Heavy Plant and Ma-
chinery for Iron and Steel; Hydraulic and Steam Turbines; Coal and Lignite; Mineral Oils;
Mining of Iron Ore, Manganese, Chrome, Gypsum, Sulphur, Gold and Diamonds, Copper,
Lead, Zin, Tin, Molybdnum, Wolfram; Aircrafts; Air Transportation; Ship Building; Tele-
phones and Telephone Cables; Telegraphs and Wireless Apparatus; and, the Generation
and Distribution of Electricity.
13At the 2-digit SIC level the industries that were liberalized are: Food; Cotton and
other Textiles; Textile Products; Basic Chemicals except Petroleum and Coal; Rubber,
Plastic, Petroleum and Coal Products; Metal Products; Machinery and Equipment; Trans-
port Equipment; Mining Services; Basic metals; Medical Equipment; Construction; and
Land and Water Transportation services. We use two and three digit SIC codes to identify
liberalized and dereserved sectors.
8The foreign ﬁrms include Enron Corporation; Cogentrix; AES Transpower;
Rolls Royce; Powergen; British Telecom; AT&T; Deutsche Telekom; and
Nippon Telegraph. In air transportation a number of domestic and for-
eign joint venture ﬁrms also entered the airline industry, although some of
these ﬁrms eventually exited the market because of continuing government
regulations that favored the state-owned domestic carrier.14
Other deregulation measures undertaken since 1991 include the removal
of the industrial licensing system under which private sector investments had
to be approved by the government; removal of restrictions on investments
made by large business groups; removal of restrictions on industrial location;
and removal of restrictions on the expansion of business groups. Finally, the
government also removed quantity restrictions and reduced import tariﬀsi n
most sectors.
In our data we investigate the eﬀect of partial privatization and also
control for the eﬀects of dereservation and liberalization.
3 Theory and empirical implications
Ownership structure should not matter if complete contracts can be writ-
ten and enforced (Coase, 1960; Williamson, 1985; and Grossman and Hart,
1986). Public sector ﬁrms are generally argued to be less eﬃcient than pri-
vate sector ﬁrms (in relatively competitive markets) because of low-powered
managerial incentives. There are two non-mutually exclusive perspectives
o nt h ec a u s e so fp o o ri n c e n t i v e s( L a ﬀont and Tirole, 1993). First, the polit-
ical perspective argues that a government pursues multiple objectives and
some of these objectives, unlike proﬁt maximization, are hard to contract
on. Ownership in this case makes a diﬀerence when unforeseen contingencies
arise which are not in the contract between the manager and the govern-
ment. Williamson (1985) argued that in this case public ownership may
be preferable because a social welfare maximizing government could impose
socially desirable outcomes, whereas it would have to bargain with a private
ﬁrm. However, this advantage would disappear in the case of a non-welfare
maximizing government (Sappington and Stiglitz, 1987). Moreover, in the
presence of incomplete contracts, diﬀerent government objectives can lead to
expropriation of manager investments and result in suboptimal investment
by managers ex ante (Laﬀont and Tirole, 1993). There may also be distor-
14A number of foreign ﬁrms have also exited the market recently as for example the
high-proﬁle pull-out of Enron in 2001 due to non-payment by its only customer, a local
government entity.
9tions in the constraints of public sector managers because of the absence of a
credible bankruptcy threat to these ﬁrms. Facing a soft budget constraint,
managers have little incentive to cut costs. Soft budget constraints may
also distort managerial incentives if the government uses loans to pursue
objectives other than proﬁt maximization. We test the political perspective
by investigating whether government loans to ﬁrms can explain variation in
ﬁrm performance.
In contrast, the managerial perspective on the advantage of private over
public ownership argues that participation in the stock market gives man-
agers better incentives by monitoring ﬁrm performance and gathering infor-
mation on manager investments. As mentioned in the previous section, none
of the shares of the Indian public sector ﬁrms in our sample were traded on
the stock market prior to disinvesment. Since the extent of market liquidity
aﬀects the incentives of stock market participants to gather information on
ﬁrms (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1993) we use data on partial sales of equity
to investigate the theoretical implication that ﬁrm performance will depend
on the fraction of equity sold. A question also arises as to why managers
of public sector ﬁrms who, unlike their private sector counterparts, are not
subject to an active market for corporate control would respond to increased
monitoring of their performance. One reason could be the presence of a mar-
ket for senior executives of public sector ﬁrms, particularly high performing
public sector ﬁrms, who are in demand for their skills (Fama, 1980). A few
public sector ﬁrms have remained without directors or CEOs for a number
of years (Goyal, 1999). Disinvestment could also generate pressure on man-
agers to maintain share value both from workers who are concerned about
the possibility of layoﬀs once the ﬁrm is privately controlled and from the
government which is concerned about revenues generated from future sales
of equity in the ﬁrm. Finally, it can be argued that manager do not respond
to increased monitoring but instead to the possibility of losing their jobs
after the ﬁrm is transferred to private owners. However this argument does
not provide an unambiguous impact on managerial incentives since man-
agers could also deliberately worsen or misreport ﬁrm performance so as to
discourage potential buyers and thereby keep their jobs.
One advantage of using data on privatization in India is that it allows us
to investigate whether partial privatization mitigates ﬁrm ineﬃciency from
the managerial perspective, since none of the ﬁrms we consider have been
transferred to private owners. Given that nearly half of all public sector
enterprises are loss making as of the year 2000, it would be diﬃcult to argue
that the government pursues a proﬁt-maximization objective. Hence our
empirical work also gives an estimate of the extent to which public sector
10ineﬃciency is due to low-powered manager incentives caused by inadequate
monitoring of and information on managers.
To identify the eﬀect of partial privatization on ﬁrm performance we also
consider changes in the competitive environment of the ﬁrms. Liberalization
and dereservation policies consitute a major part of the economic reforms
since 1991, so variation in ﬁrm performance caused by increased competition
may be mistakenly attributed to the disinvestment process. The debate on
the relative importance of competition versus ownership focuses on the eﬀect
of competition on productive eﬃciency, since it is generally accepted that
competition will induce allocative eﬃciency. Competition is said to aﬀect
managers’ incentives because ineﬃcient ﬁrms face reduced market share.
Moreover, competition can also be an eﬀective monitoring device because
it facilitates performance comparisons (Hart, 1983). Vickers and Yarrow
(1991) emphasize that eﬃciency gains from privatization will also depend
on competition hence empirically the combined eﬀect of the two policies are
also of interest.
4D a t a
We observe privatization status, industry, ownership status, and a range
of accounting data for 341 manufacturing and service sector public ﬁrms
owned by the central and state governments of India. This includes 249
ﬁrms that form the population of non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms owned by the central
government, and 92 ﬁrms that are owned by various state governments. We
observe all the ﬁrms that were partially privatized by the central government
until 1998. Firm level data is obtained from company balance sheets and
annual income statements and have been collected by a private organization,
the Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy (CMIE). The panel consists
of the years 1990-1998. We have at least a year of data prior to the economic
reforms which were announced in 1991.
From the full sample we observe current sale revenues for an unbalanced
panel of 2470 ﬁrm years between 1990 and 1998 (an average of 274 ﬁrms
per year). Excluding ﬁrms that do not have information on lagged assets,
the largest available sample for 1991 - 1998 is 2063 ﬁrm years (an average of
258 ﬁrms per year).15 This includes 284 ﬁr my e a r so fo b s e r v a t i o n sf o rﬁrms
owned by regional governments. In order to avoid exacerbating attrition
15We do not have lagged observations for 1990. There are 220 ﬁrms in 1991, 231 ﬁrms
in 1992, 228 in 1993, 240 ﬁrms in 1994, 244 ﬁrms in 1995, 270 ﬁrms in 1996, 281 ﬁrms in
1997 and 244 ﬁrms in 1998.
11bias we did not require a balanced panel.
While the data contains information on a wide range of income, cost and
investment variables, it does not include ownership information except for
the most current year reported for each ﬁrm. We supplement this data with
information on privatization transactions from the Department of Heavy En-
terprises, India, the World Bank Privatization Transactions Database, and
from newspaper reports. The privatization information we collect includes
t h ef r a c t i o ns o l do faﬁrm, the year of sale, and the method of sale which
generally consists of public oﬀerings and global depository receipts. There
are 36 ﬁrms in our sample that have been partially privatized with some
ﬁrms being sold in more than one tranche.16
We obtain data on ﬁrm employment from the Annual Public Enterprise
Survey published by the government. However, employment data is only
available for a subset of the ﬁrms owned by the central government, reducing
t h es a m p l es i z ew h e nw ec o n s i d e rs p e c i ﬁcations that include employment.
Our data has a number of advantages over other studies that consider
the eﬀects of privatization. First, we have the population of non-ﬁnancial
public ﬁrms owned by the government of India. In terms of asset size, em-
ployment, market share, and political importance the central government
owned ﬁrms form the bulk of state ownership in India. The study of priva-
tization in Mexico by Laporta and Lopez-de-Silanes (1999) is the only other
study to use the population of non-ﬁnancial privatized ﬁrms. However, the
key advantage of our data is that we also observe state-owned ﬁrms that
were not privatized. Second, although data from the same source, CMIE,
has been used in other contexts, this is the ﬁrst to include data on employ-
ment and ownership for each year. Third, studies investigating the eﬀect of
privatization generally do not contain detailed ownership information such
as the fraction sold, and hence are not able to capture the eﬀect of variations
in ownership (e.g. Frydman et al., 1999, only observe whether a ﬁrm has
been privatized).
Table 1 reports the frequency distribution of privatization between 1991
and 1998 and the average fraction sold in each year. As seen in Table 1 the
l a r g e s tn u m b e ro fp r i v a t i z a t i o n so c c u r r e di n1 9 9 2 ,ay e a ra f t e rt h er e f o r m s
were announced, with an average of 12% of shares of 26 ﬁrms being oﬀered
on the stock market. Table 1 also reports the number of ﬁrms in dereserved
sectors and liberalized sectors.
1611 ﬁrms have undergone partial privatization in one tranche only.
125R e s u l t s
We investigate the impact of partial privatization on the following broad
measures of proﬁtability and eﬃciency: sales, accounting proﬁts, employ-
ment, average product of labor, and the returns to labor. The variables are
described in the Appendix. Table 2 provides summary statistics for selected
variables for 1991-1998 by ownership category.
From Table 2 it appears that partially privatized ﬁrms have higher sales,
proﬁts, labor, average product of labor, assets, and returns to labor than
ﬁrms that remain state-owned. They also appear to receive a lower share of
loans from the government compared to fully state-owned ﬁrms. Although
the average characteristics of these ﬁrms is interesting, we need to establish
whether the observed performance diﬀerences arise as a result of partial
privatization. Table 3 presents before-after summary statistics of selected
performance measures for ﬁrms that were privatized between 1991 and 1998.
Since shares of some of the ﬁrms in our sample were sold in more than
one tranche, we deﬁne the pre and post measures as average values of the
variables for the years before and after the ﬁrst tranche.
The descriptive statistics in Table 3 show that ﬁrms experience an in-
crease in sales and proﬁts after privatization. Sales are 59 percentage points
higher on average after privatization, with the diﬀerence being signiﬁcant
at the 5 per cent level. Similarly, average proﬁts are signiﬁcantly higher in
the years following the ﬁrst tranche of privatization, registering an average
increase of 22.6 percentage points. This increase in proﬁtability is higher
than found in similar studies. For example Laporta and Lopez-di-Silanes
(1999), comparing the means of performance variables before and after pri-
vatization, ﬁnd that the mean change in operating income to sales after
privatization was 24.1 percentage points in their sample of Mexican ﬁrms.
Partial privatization does not appear to have much of an impact on the
stock of ﬁxed assets, reﬂecting the fact that public sector investments have
been declining since 1991. It also appears that there is a signiﬁcant decrease
in the average share of government loans and subsidies in total borrowing
after partial privatization.
The before-after estimator above relies on the assumption that among
privatized ﬁrms the mean outcome in the years before privatization are the
same as what would be the mean outcome in the years after in the absence of
privatization. This assumption would be violated if, for example, there are
changes in the overall state of the economy between these years, or if there
are changes in the life-cycle position of some of these privatized ﬁrms. Below
we use panel data to estimate a ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcation which allows
13us to control for macroeconomic changes and estimate the average impact
of private ownership by comparing partially privatized ﬁrms to those that
remain state-owned throughout this period.
5.1 Estimating the eﬀect of partial private ownership
While Table 3 compared the before after performance of ﬁrms that were
partially privatized, we would like to investigate the average impact of pri-
vatization, and variations in performance that arise out of variations in the
level of equity that is private. We investigate the average impact of privatiza-
tion by comparing privatized ﬁrms to ﬁrms that remain state-owned through
1991-1998 by estimating the following ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcation:
yit = α + PRIVitβ + Xitγ + YEA R tθ + εit,
where PRIVit measures the fraction of equity of ﬁrm i, lying between 0
and 100, that is privately owned in period t. We assess the impact on
proﬁtability by examining both sales and accounting proﬁts. Speciﬁcally
the dependent variables for proﬁtability are (log) sales and (log) proﬁts. We
also investigate the eﬀect on eﬃciency with the (log) average product of labor
and the returns to employment as dependent variables. Finally we examine
if partial privatization has an impact on employment with (log) labor as the
dependent variable. The Xit variables are ﬁrm speciﬁc factors including ﬁrm
size measured by one-year lagged values of (log) gross ﬁxed assets, and the
one-year lagged share of government ﬁnancing in total borrowing. Including
the ﬁrms that remain state-owned as the control group allows us to estimate
the average impact of private ownership, and control for contemporaneous
macroeconomic shocks. This speciﬁcation also allows for a ﬁrm-speciﬁc ﬁxed
eﬀect, αi, which reﬂects ﬁxed diﬀerences across ﬁrms that are constant but
unobserved over time, time eﬀe c t sw h i c ha r ec o m m o nt oﬁrms but vary
over time given by the year dummies YEA R , and a random unobserved
component εit.
Government loans are also used by Bartel and Harrison (2001) as an
explanatory variable (they use the share of government loans in total in-
vestment) to capture the eﬀe c t so fas o f tb u d g e tc o n s t r a i n to np u b l i cs e c t o r
ﬁrms. Soft budget constraints are expected to have a negative impact on
ﬁrm performance if they are used by the government to pursue other ob-
jectives. They can also distort managerial incentives because they insulate
public sector managers from the discipline of a bankruptcy threat.17 The
results are presented in Table 4.
17However, Laﬀont and Tirole (1993) point out that even private regulated ﬁrms are
14It can be seen from Table 4 that the fraction of equity that is private in a
given year has a positive and statistically signiﬁcant (at the 1 per cent level)
impact on all proﬁtability and labor productivity measures. In column 1
of Table 4 increasing private equity by 10 percentage points would increase
sales by 27 percentage points on average. In column 2 we ﬁnd that the
lagged share of government loans over total borrowing, which is a proxy for
soft budget constraints, has a negative and slightly statistically signiﬁcant
impact on current sales.18
In columns 3 and 4 we investigate the impact on (log) accounting proﬁts,
and the results are similar to those reported for sales.19 A 10 percentage
point decrease in government ownership would increase proﬁts by 15 per-
centage points and this coeﬃcient is also signiﬁcant at the 1 per cent level.
In column 4 soft budget constraints have a smaller but negative and statis-
tically signiﬁcant (at the 10 per cent level) impact on proﬁts.
Examining the average impact of privatization on eﬃciency, columns 5
and 6 show that private ownership has a positive and statistically signiﬁcant
eﬀect (at the 1 per cent level) on the average product of labor as measured
by the (log) ratio of sales to employment.20 Size of capital, as measured
by the log of lagged gross ﬁxed assets, also has a signiﬁcant and positive
impact on the average product of labor, however the coeﬃcient does not re-
main signiﬁcant when we include the government loans variable. The lagged
share of government loans in total borrowing has no impact on the average
product of labor. In columns 7 and 8 we use returns to employment (the
ratio of operating income to employment) as the dependent variable. This
measure of eﬃc i e n c yh a sa l s ob e e nu s e db yL a P o r t aa n dL o p e z - d i - S i l a n e s
(1999) among others. The coeﬃcient of PRIV is positive and statistically
signiﬁcant at the 1 per cent level. In contrast to its eﬀect on sale revenues
and proﬁts, the lagged share of government loans in total borrowing has a
positive and signiﬁcant impact on returns to employment.
Investigating the average eﬀect of private ownership on employment in
c o l u m n s9a n d1 0o fT a b l e4 ,w eﬁnd that the level of private ownership
bailed out by regulators, hence the problem with soft budget constraints is not exclusively
restricted to public ﬁrms.
18On average 13 ﬁrms in each year do not report government loans received in the
previous year. 4 ﬁrms do not report government loans in any years.
19The fewer number of observations is due to the fact that six ﬁrms do not report proﬁts
in 1997. We ran all the speciﬁcations in Tables 4 and 5 with the smallest balanced panel
of 1506 ﬁrms. The coeﬃcients retain their signiﬁcance and sign and diﬀer very slightly in
magnitude. These results are available on request.
20There are fewer observations since we were unable to obtain employment data for
some ﬁrms in some years. Only one ﬁrm is missing employment in all years.
15does not lead to a decline in employment, and is even slightly positive and
signiﬁcant when we do not control for the lagged share of government loans
in total borrowing. This result is consistent with the conventional wisdom
that partial privatization has not resulted in labor restructuring. Moreover,
this also oﬀers further evidence that the government’s objectives have not
undergone a signiﬁcant change since there do not appear to be any layoﬀso f
surplus workers following partial privatization. Finally, we report the F-test
of joint signiﬁcance for the ﬁrm ﬁxed-eﬀects and ﬁnd that the ﬁxed eﬀects
are jointly diﬀerent from zero in all the speciﬁcations.
The evidence regarding the average impact of partial privatization on
revenues, proﬁtability, and operating eﬃciency suggests that managers of
these ﬁrms undertake eﬃciency and proﬁt-enhancing actions, possibly be-
cause public stock price information facilitates monitoring of manager per-
formance. One could argue that without bankruptcy risks or a market for
corporate control, managers need not respond to more high-powered incen-
tives. However, the presence of a market for managerial skills could lead to
restructuring eﬀorts among managers whose performance is now being mon-
itored more frequently or more accurately (Fama, 1980). Alternatively, the
additional information on ﬁrm performance may also be used by the gov-
ernment and workers of the ﬁrm to monitor managers more eﬀectively. As
mentioned earlier, the alternative explanation that managers’ incentives are
not aﬀected by better information, but instead by the possibility of losing
their jobs after privatization, does not provide an unambiguous prediction
since managers may also take actions to discourage potential buyers. It
may also be the case that the increase in revenues and proﬁts are a result
of a reduction in corruption, rather than an increase in production. Due
to increased monitoring of ﬁrm performance managers may stop illegally
redirecting output to non-paying customers (Laporta and Lopez-di-Silanes,
1999, argue that this may also have been the case with Mexican ﬁrms).
It may be worthwhile to mention that we have also investigated the
diﬀerence between pre and post privatization performance. In particular we
include a dummy variable in the above estimations for the years preceding
the ﬁrst tranche in which a ﬁrm is sold. In contrast to other studies that ﬁnd
revenue and proﬁtability measures increase prior to privatization (Dewenter
and Malatesta, 2001) we ﬁnd that sales and proﬁtability are likely to be
signiﬁcantly lower in the prior years. Hence there is little evidence to suggest
that ﬁrms manipulate their accounts prior to privatization. To save space
we do not report these results.
That private ownership has an impact on ﬁrm performance at all is
surprising since on average less than two percent of equity is private over
16this period in our sample. Even among the 36 privatized ﬁrms the average
value of PRIV is 16.32 per cent between 1991 and 1998. Moreover all
these ﬁrms remained under government control over this period, leading us
to conclude that the average impact of this variable captures the eﬀect of
increased monitoring on managers rather than restructuring brought about
by a change in owner objectives.
5.2 Evaluating the eﬀect of increased competition
We now explore another possible source of variation in ﬁrm performance
by investigating whether partial privatization still has an impact when we
control for changes in the competitive environment of ﬁrms. We estimate
the previous speciﬁcations by introducing two dummy variables that capture
the changing eﬀect over time of increased competition. The ﬁrst is a dummy
variable that equals one if the ﬁrm is an industry which was originally re-
served for the public sector and subsequently opened to the private sector,
DEREST, which is interacted with a time trend. The second is a dummy
variable that equals one if the ﬁrm is an industry where the government
removed restrictions on foreign entry, LIBT, and it is also interacted with
a time trend. An advantage of using these variables is that they measure
potential entry due to deregulation rather than actual measures of market
concentration and entry after deregulation, and hence do not suﬀer from
endogeneity problems. The results are presented in Table 5.
The coeﬃcient of the fraction of private equity remains positive, of simi-
lar magnitude, and statistically signiﬁcant at 1 per cent for sales, proﬁtabil-
ity, and the eﬃciency measures when we control for changes in competitive
conditions. The lagged share of government loans in total borrowing con-
tinues to have a negative and statistically signiﬁcant impact on sales and
proﬁts, and a positive impact on returns to labor. The impact of dereserva-
tion, as measured by the coeﬃcient of DEREST, is positive and statistically
signiﬁcant for sales and proﬁts. Dereservation has the additional eﬀect of
reducing employment in ﬁrms compared to ﬁrms in industries that were
not restricted to government enterprises21. Freeing restrictions on private
participation does not, however, have an impact on the average product of
labor and the returns to employment, as seen in columns 4 and 5. In con-
trast to the eﬀect of dereservation, liberalization of restrictions on foreign
entry has a statistically signiﬁcant negative impact on sales. The diﬀer-
ent eﬀect of dereservation and liberalization on sales is interesting since
21We do not have ﬁrms in our data which belong to sectors that are still reserved such
as arms and ammunition, atomic energy, and railways.
17both policies increase competition. The positive eﬀect on ﬁrm sales in sec-
tors previously reserved for state-owned ﬁrms may reﬂect the impact of less
government intervention, or partnerships with private domestic and foreign
ﬁrms. Although most of the ﬁrms in liberalized sectors were already com-
peting with domestic companies before 1991, it has been argued that prior
to the economic reforms, most industries, even those with domestic private
sector ﬁrms, were not globally competitive because they enjoyed protection
from imports and other favorable government policies. Hence at least in the
short run the entry of foreign companies and foreign imports has adversely
aﬀected sales in ﬁrms in these sectors.
Relative to sectors that were never reserved for the government and
those sectors that have not been opened to foreign companies, ﬁrms in both
dereserved and liberalized sectors have lower employment on average, as seen
in columns 6 of Table 5. Hence competitive pressures increase allocative
eﬃciency by forcing ﬁrms to undertake some labor restructuring.
The results of Table 5 indicate that the eﬀect of selling equity in a given
year on ﬁrm performance cannot be attributed to changes in the competitive
environment since PRIV continues to have a statistically signiﬁcant impact
(at the 1 per cent level) on revenues, proﬁts, and productivity. From the evi-
dence it also appears that competition and privatization are complementary
in their eﬀect on ﬁrm performance, with partial sales increasing proﬁtability
and productive eﬃciency on average, while competition appears to increase
allocative eﬃciency. It also appears that the eﬀect on managers’ incentives
of dereservation policies has been positive, at least in terms of increasing
sales and proﬁts. However, contrary to Vickers and Yarrow (1991), the evi-
dence suggests that competitive pressures alone would not fully address this
ineﬃciency since competition policy does not have a broad impact on labor
productivity.
5.3 Addressing problems in estimation strategy
The main advantage of a ﬁxed eﬀects estimation in the program evaluation
literature is that it would control for the sort of selection bias that may
arise if for example more shares are likely to be sold of better ﬁrms, where
the unobservable characteristics do not change over time. However ﬁxed
eﬀect estimations may result in inconsistent estimates if there is dynamic
selection into privatization. For example, we would overestimate the impact
of privatization if privatized ﬁrms experience a decline in performance prior
to privatization which other ﬁrms do not, a phenomenon commonly referred
to as “Ashenfelter’s dip” (Ashenfelter, 1978). Like Bartel and Harrison
18(2001), we compare the pre-privatization performance of ﬁrms to that of
ﬁrms that did not change ownership. Table 6 compares the change in sales,
change in employment, and change in average product between t and t − 1
for ﬁrms privatized in year t with ﬁrms that did not change ownership in
that year. The results show that ﬁrms do not perform diﬀerently in terms of
sales, employment or average product compared to the control group prior
to privatization.
Dynamic selection bias may also arise for example if the government is
likely to select ﬁrms for privatization that have better management, or ﬁrms
that are likely to adapt better to the new liberalization policies, but these
factors are unobservable to the researcher and not ﬁxed over time. It would
be impossible to control for all such factors particularly if they are unob-
served and evolve over time. However, if ﬁrms that are selected for privatiza-
tion share similar characteristics that are not captured by pre-privatization
measures and materialize over time, then comparing ﬁrms privatized in a
given year to a control group of ﬁrms that have also been selected for pri-
vatization, but are privatized in other years, may allow us to control for
this type of selection bias. Frydman et al. (1999) use this approach by
comparing ﬁrms that were privatized later to ﬁrms that were privatized ear-
lier. Since privatization is distributed over several years in our data, in any
given year we also observe ﬁrms privatized in later years that potentially
share similar unobservable time variant characteristics. In the control group
we also include all the ﬁrms that have been partially and fully privatized
between 1998 (the last year of our sample) and 2001, including 5 ﬁrms for
which sales negotiations were completed in late 2001. We estimate the spec-
iﬁcations in Table 5 and report the results in Table 7. The coeﬃcient of
the PRIV variable remains similar to Tables 4 and 5 in magnitude and sta-
tistical signiﬁcance for almost all the speciﬁcations other than employment.
It is interesting to note that the lagged share of government loans in total
borrowing now has a signiﬁcant and positive impact on employment in the
smaller sample, consistent with Shleifer and Vishny’s (1994) view that the
government may use loans to induce ﬁrms to retain surplus labor.
The institutional background of the disinvestment process in India leads
us to believe that dynamic selection is not a major problem. The debate in
policy circles and in the media has focused on the absence of a privatization
plan on which ﬁrms to sell, how much to sell, and when to sell. An editorial
in the prominent Indian business newspaper T h eE c o n o m i cT i m e s(May,
2001) reﬂecting general perception about the process thus far commented:
“The disinvestment programme of the government is completely incoherent
and lacks transparency and conviction.”
19Griliches and Hausman (1986) note that errors in variables can be height-
ened by ﬁxed eﬀects. We do not think measurement error is a problem since
the privatization variable is quite statistically signiﬁcant, while measurement
error tends to bias coeﬃcients towards zero.
We also conduct some other robustness checks. In particular we reesti-
mate excluding oil and gas companies which are arguably the more proﬁtable
companies that were partially privatized. We do not ﬁnd any evidence that
these results are being driven by particular sectors. For example for the
speciﬁcation in column 1 of Table 4 we ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient (standard
error) of PRIV is .029(.004) and signiﬁcant at the 1 per cent level, and it
retains its sign, magnitude and signiﬁc a n c ef o rt h eo t h e rs p e c i ﬁcations as
well. The results are similar when we include the competition variables.
We also estimate these speciﬁcations by excluding ﬁrms owned by re-
gional governments. Once again we ﬁnd the results to be substantially sim-
ilar with all the coeﬃcients retaining their sign and signiﬁcance. There is
no evidence that the results of Tables 4 and 5 are aﬀected by the inclusion
of these ﬁrms.
6C o n c l u s i o n
We ﬁnd that partial privatization in the form of diﬀuse minority sales of
shares has a positive impact on ﬁrm proﬁtability and eﬃciency without be-
ing accompanied by a decline in employment. Since there is no transfer of
control it is diﬃcult to argue that the observed improvement in performance
occurs because of a shift in owners’ objectives to proﬁt maximization. In-
stead, improvements in ﬁrm performance are more likely to have occurred
because of a change in manager incentives as a result of more information
on and monitoring of managers after partial privatization. Partial priva-
tization can also increase the incentives of stock market analysts to follow
the performance of a government owned ﬁrm because of the possibility that
more shares will be sold in the future.
Policies that increase competition also have an impact on ﬁrm perfor-
mance. We ﬁnd that removal of entry barriers in sectors that were restricted
to government-owned ﬁrms has a favorable impact on sales, but liberaliza-
tion of restrictions on foreign ownership appears, at least in the short run,
to reduce sales. Moreover, competitive pressures appear to force managers
to make layoﬀs.Our results suggest that both partial privatization and com-
petition aﬀect the performance of these public sector ﬁrms.
One useful extension of this analysis would be to include additional pol-
20icy variables measuring changes in market conditions such as trade policy
changes. It would also be useful to include private sector ﬁr m si nt h i sa n a l y -
sis and compare government-owned ﬁrms to their private sector counter-
parts.
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23APPENDIX: DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES USED IN TABLES 2-7
Variable Description
SALES Log of annual revenue generated by an enterprise from its main business activity
measured by charges to customers for goods supplied and services rendered.
Excludes income from activities not related to main business, such as dividends,
interest, and rents in the case of industrial firms, as well as non-recurring income.
PROFITS Log of the annual excess of income over all expenditures except tax, depreciation,
interest payments, rent, and extra ordinary expenditures. Does not include extra-
ordinary income and income from sources not related to main business activity.
LABOR Log of the total number of employees in a year including managerial staff.
ASSETS Log of annual gross fixed assets which include movable and immovable assets as
well as assets which are in the process of being installed
AVERAGE PRODUC
OF LABOR




Log of the sum of annual loans received from the central and state governments




Log of total borrowings including loans from banks, institutions, debentures,
other companies, tax deferrals, foreign and other borrowings.
GOVT LOAN/
TOT BORR
Ratio of government loans to total borrowings
RETURNS TO
LABOR
Ratio of operating income to total employment. Operating income is measured as
sales minus the total cost of raw materials, wages and energy costs.
DEREST Dummy variable that is equal to one if the firm is in an industry that was reserved
for government-owned firms until 1991, interacted with a time trend
LIBT Dummy variable that is equal to one if the firm is in an industry that removed
restrictions on foreign ownership after 1991, interacted with a time trend
PRIV Variable that lies between 0 and 100 measuring the fraction of equity that is
private in a firm in a given year
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DISTRIBUTION OF DERESERVED FIRMS AND LIBERALIZED FIRMS (NUMBER OF FIRM
YEARS)








Notes:  36 central government firms partially privatized between 1991 and 1998 of which some are sold
in several tranches. 2 state government firms also included. Equity sold lies between 0 and 100.TABLE 2










































































Notes: Variables are not measured in logs. Units equal millions of US$. Labor measured in actual number
of workers. N refers to firm years for each variable and ownership category. Share of government loans
over total borrowing is lagged one year as in regressions.  Sample size is same as in Tables 3, 4 and 5.TABLE 3





























































Notes: All variables measured in logs, standard errors of means in parentheses. Mean values computed for
firm performance before and after the first tranche of privatization for each firm.
 * Significant at the 10 per cent level
  ** Significant at the 5 per cent level
*** Significant at the 1 per cent levelTABLE 4
THE IMPACT OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIP ON FIRM PERFORMANCE








































































































































Notes:  Specifications control for firm level fixed effects (within regressions).  Standard errors are in
parentheses. All RHS variables except PRIV are lagged one year. All performance variables are measured
in logarithms except returns to labor and the share of government loans in total borrowing.
    * Significant at the 10 per cent level
  ** Significant at the 5 per cent level
*** Significant at the 1 per cent level
a: Joint significance test for all coefficients
b: Joint significance test for firm fixed effects, F statistic distributed with (N, NT-N-k-1) degrees of
freedom, where N equals number of firms, T equals number of years, and k is the number of RHS
variables.TABLE 5
THE IMPACT OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIP AND COMPETITION
ON FIRM PERFORMANCE
















































































































Notes: Specifications control for firm level fixed effects (within regressions).  Standard errors are in
parentheses. All RHS variables except PRIV are lagged one year. All performance variables are measured
in logarithms except returns to labor and the share of government loans in total borrowing and the dummy
variables DEREST and LIBT.
    * Significant at the 10 per cent level
  ** Significant at the 5 per cent level
*** Significant at the 1 per cent level
a: Joint significance test for all coefficients
b: Joint significance test for firm fixed effects, F statistic distributed with (N, NT-N-k-1) degrees of
freedom , where N equals number of firms, T equals number of years, and k is the number of RHS
variables.TABLE 6







t-statistic of difference in
means

















Notes: Standard errors of means in parentheses for all growth measures.  Performance measures are log
differences. Year t is year of privatization.TABLE 7
THE IMPACT OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIP AND COMPETITION
ON FIRM PERFORMANCE














































































































































































Notes: Specifications control for firm level fixed effects (within regressions).  Standard errors are in
parentheses. All RHS variables except PRIV are lagged one year. All performance variables are measured
in logarithms except returns to labor and the share of government loans in total borrowing and the dummy
variables DEREST and LIBT.  See notes to Table 5.